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Note
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEC: DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT
OPENS THE GATE TO “PHANTOM” POLITICAL SPEAKERS
Esther Houseman ∗
In Citizens United v. FEC, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that a ban on the use of corporate and union general treasuries to fund
speech advocating the election or defeat of a political candidate violated the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2 The majority reached
this holding by finding that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s
(“BCRA”) 3 ban on the use of general treasury funds to finance independent
expenditures constituted an “outright ban” on corporate political speech.4
In so holding, the Court failed to recognize the distinct threat that
corporations pose to the political process.5 That is, corporations are able to
use the corporate form to create the appearance of strong political backing
for a political position that does not reflect the support of actual individuals,
individuals who have provided funds for the purpose of supporting a
corporation’s political speech. 6
Additionally, in reaching its holding, the Citizens United Court
improperly extrapolated assertions from its decisions in Buckley v. Valeo7
and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. 8 The Court relied on its
assertion in Buckley that speech restrictions based on a speaker’s wealth are

∗
Esther Houseman is a second-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law,
where she is a staff editor of the Maryland Law Review. The author would like to thank Professor
Deborah Hellman for her insightful feedback and suggestions and the Maryland Law Review staff
for their help in preparing this Note for publication.
1. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Id. at 886–87, 896–97, 913.
3. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36,
and 47 U.S.C. (2006)).
4. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887, 896–97.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
8. 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see supra Part IV.B.
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impermissible 9 and its assertion in Bellotti that “the worth of speech ‘does
not depend upon the identity of its source’” 10 to erroneously conclude that
restrictions on corporate independent political expenditures are
unconstitutional. 11
Furthermore, the Court mischaracterized the
antidistortion rationale it applied in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce 12 as an outlier in the Court’s corporate expenditure
jurisprudence. 13 To the contrary, Austin’s antidistortion rationale was not
an anomaly but a natural extension of the exception to corporate
expenditure restrictions 14 that the Court crafted in FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life (“MCFL”). 15
As a consequence of Citizens United, political distortion will now
manifest in two forms: (1) the political marketplace of ideas, and possibly
the composition of representative government itself, will be skewed by the
addition of inordinately large sums of corporate money; and (2) it will be
impossible to trace money from corporate general treasuries back to actual
individuals’ support for the political speech in question.16 Thus, by
allowing corporations to use their general treasuries to make campaign
expenditures, the Citizens United majority has invited “phantom speakers”
to participate in, and distort, American politics via the marketplace of
political speech. 17
I. THE CASE
On January 7, 2008, Citizens United, a politically conservative
nonprofit membership corporation that is tax-exempt under Internal
Revenue Code Section 501(c)(4), 18 notified the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia that it had released its highly critical

9. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (“The First Amendment’s protections do not
depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public discussion’” (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 49)).
10. See id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777).
11. See infra Part IV.B.
12. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. See infra Part IV.C.
15. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The MCFL exception permits a nonprofit corporation to make
campaign expenditures from its general treasury only if the nonprofit corporation meets certain
criteria that prove the nonprofit’s shareholders actually support the nonprofit’s political speech.
See id. at 263–64.
16. See infra Part IV.D.
17. See infra Part IV.D.
18. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006) (exempting “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized
for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare” from taxation).
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documentary, Hillary: The Movie, “for public sale and exhibition.”19
Hillary highlighted then-Senator Hillary Clinton’s White House record
during President Bill Clinton’s presidency, her Senate record, and her
presidential campaign, and it offered a critical assessment of her fitness for
the office of the President of the United States. 20 Citizens United
scheduled Hillary for release via video-on-demand and funded an
accompanying advertising campaign that it scheduled to run, if Clinton
were to secure the Democratic presidential nomination, within thirty days of
the Democratic National Committee Convention and within sixty days of
the November 2008 general election. 21 Citizens United sought to prevent
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) from banning the movie’s videoon-demand distribution and accompanying advertisements under
Sections 203, 201, and 311 of the BCRA. 22 Specifically, Citizens United
sought injunctive relief declaring that Section 203 of the BCRA
unconstitutionally burdened the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech—both as applied to Hillary and on its face 23—so that it could
distribute Hillary via video-on-demand without the risk of civil and
criminal penalties under the BCRA. 24
Section 203 of the BCRA bars corporations and unions from funding
electioneering communications25 using general treasury funds, 26 and this
prohibition applies to all primary elections or political conventions for any
federal office.27
BCRA Section 201 lays out extensive disclosure
requirements, 28 including the disclosure of the names and addresses of
19. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The film’s “release date coincide[d] with the dates when many states
[held their] primary elections or party caucuses.” Id. For examples of negative commentary about
then-Senator Hillary Clinton offered by the film’s narrator, see id. at 279 n.12.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 275−76. Citizens United planned to fund at least three advertisements—one thirtysecond advertisement, “Questions,” and two ten-second advertisements, “Wait” and “Pants”—to
coincide with the release of Hillary to promote the movie. Id. In its filings and at oral argument,
the FEC conceded that the BCRA § 203 prohibitions against electioneering communications did
not apply to the advertisements. Id. at 277 n.9.
22. Id. at 277.
23. Id. at 278.
24. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 888 (2010).
25. An electioneering communication is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication
which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; [and] is made within 60 days
before a general, special, or runoff election” or “30 days before a primary or preference election,
or a convention or caucus of a political party.” 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(I)−(II) (2006).
26. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b),
declared unconstitutional by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
27. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
28. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81, 88–90 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434) (requiring
political committees and individuals to file various reports with the FEC disclosing, inter alia, the
amount of funds contributed to political candidates, the amount of expenditures made, the identity
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certain contributors.29 For those electioneering communications that are
not banned under the BCRA, Section 311 requires disclaimers that identify
the sources of funding for the communication.30
To determine whether a preliminary injunction was warranted, the
district court 31 first assessed whether there was a substantial likelihood that
Citizens United would succeed on the merits of its Section 203 claim.32
The court concluded that Citizens United could not possibly prevail in a
Section 203 facial challenge, because to do so the court would have to
overrule a portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in McConnell v. FEC,33
in which the Court had upheld Section 203. 34 The district court then
rejected Citizens United’s as-applied challenge, finding that because Hillary
“is susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the electorate that
Senator Clinton is unfit for office,” the movie is “the functional equivalent”
of the kind of express advocacy prohibited by the Supreme Court’s ruling in
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”). 35 Thus, the district court found
that Hillary fell within the McConnell holding that upheld BCRA

of each person making contributions or expenditures, and identifying information including the
principal place of business of persons making expenditures for electioneering communications).
29. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(5).
30. Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 311, 116 Stat. 81, 105–06 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)).
Electioneering communications that are not authorized by a candidate must include a clear
disclaimer that provides the “name and permanent street address, telephone number, or World
Wide Web address” of the entity that funded the communication. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3).
31. The case was heard before a three judge panel in the District Court for the District of
Columbia because Citizens United challenged the law using the statute’s own judicial review
mechanisms. See 2 U.S.C. § 437h (establishing the procedure for judicial review of actions
arising under the BCRA).
32. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278−80 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam).
33. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Citizens
United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (“Only the Supreme Court may overrule its decisions. The lower
courts are bound to follow them.”).
34. The Supreme Court in McConnell rejected claims that financing “electioneering
communications” fall within the protection of the First Amendment. Citizens United, 530 F.
Supp. 2d at 278 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09). The district court further rejected
Citizens United’s theory that FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (“WRTL”), 551 U.S. 449
(2007), narrowed McConnell and left § 203 vulnerable to “‘facial invalidation.’” Citizens United,
530 F. Supp. 2d at 278. Citizens United’s theory was that WRTL narrowed McConnell by holding
that an advertisement is only express advocacy subject to the § 203 prohibition if it “‘is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.’” Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (quoting WRTL, 551 U.S. at 469−70). The
court found that adopting Citizens United’s theory would require overruling McConnell and
rejected it on those grounds. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
35. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 279–80; see also WTRL, 551 U.S. at 469−70 (“[A]
court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is
susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.”).
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Section 203’s corporate expenditures on electioneering communications,
leaving no possibility that Citizens United would prevail on the merits.36
The district court also determined that Citizens United could not
prevail on its challenge to Section 201’s disclosure and Section 311’s
disclaimer requirements.37 In so finding, the court relied on McConnell,
which had upheld these provisions “for the ‘entire range of electioneering
communications,’” noting that “Citizen’s advertisements obviously are
within that range.” 38 Upon considering the remaining factors for granting a
preliminary injunction, 39 the district court determined that an injunction
would not further the public interest.40 Accordingly, the court denied
Citizens United’s request for a preliminary injunction with respect to all
claims presented. 41
Citizens United filed a jurisdictional statement, appealing the district
court’s decision directly to the Supreme Court.42 The Court dismissed the
appeal “for want of jurisdiction,” 43 and the case returned to the district
court on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Citizens United and
the FEC. 44 The district court granted the FEC’s motion for summary
36. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 280.
37. Id. at 281.
38. Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196). Citizens United may have prevailed on its asapplied challenge if it had provided evidence to show that disclosure would lead to reprisals
against its members, but Citizens United provided no such evidence. Id. (citing McConnell, 540
U.S. at 198–99).
39. To secure a preliminary injunction, a movant is required to demonstrate “that it has 1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted, 3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested
parties, and 4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.” Id. at 277–78
(quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 282. In finding that the public interest would not be served, the court relied on the
Supreme Court’s determination in McConnell that BCRA’s § 203 prohibitions “assist the public in
making informed decisions, limit the coercive effect of corporate speech, and assist the FEC in
enforcing contribution limits.” Id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, 205, 231). The court did
not address two of the four preliminary injunction factors: whether the movant would suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted and whether the injunction would
substantially injure another interested party. See supra note 39.
41. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282. The court denied as moot the request for a
preliminary injunction with respect to the application of § 203 to the advertisement “Questions”
because the FEC conceded that the advertisement was exempt from BCRA § 203. Id. at 277 n.9,
282.
42. Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Citizens United v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 1471 (2008) (No. 07953). Citizens United appealed the district court decision directly to the Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (2006), which provides that “any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an
order granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or
proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges.” Id.
43. Citizens United v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 1732 (2008) (mem.).
44. Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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judgment, basing its decision on the reasoning in its prior opinion that had
denied Citizens United’s request for declaratory relief and a preliminary
injunction. 45
Citizens United appealed once more to the Supreme Court, and the
Court noted probable jurisdiction over the case.46 After hearing arguments
on Citizens United’s facial challenges to BCRA’s disclosure provisions, as
well as its as-applied challenges, 47 the Court decided to hear the case
reargued. 48 The Court ordered the parties to supply a supplemental brief
discussing whether a ban on the use of corporate and union general
treasuries for campaign expenditures was facially unconstitutional, thus
setting the stage to overrule either Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
49
Commerce, in which the Court had articulated its antidistortion rationale,
or the part of McConnell that upheld BCRA Section 203 on its face—or
both. 50
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment freedom of speech has its greatest force when
applied to political speech. 51 Congress, however, has a long-standing
history of treating corporations differently for the purposes of regulating
campaign expenditures—money spent by individuals to advocate for the
election or defeat of a candidate52—and has traditionally justified separate
treatment as necessary to prevent corruption of the democratic political
process. 53 Through decades of state and federal corporate campaign
expenditure regulation, 54 the Supreme Court has afforded great deference to

45. Id.; see also supra notes 32–41 (describing the reasoning that led to the district court’s
original denial of Citizens United’s request for declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction).
46. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008) (mem.).
47. The Court heard the first round of argument in the case on March 24, 2009. See generally
Oral Argument, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf.
48. The Court heard the second round of argument on September 9, 2009. Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 876. The Supreme Court generally permits reargument “in the most legally
complicated, highly salient, and politically contentious cases.” James F. Spriggs II & David R.
Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 541 (2011) (citing Valerie Hoekstra &
Timothy Johnson, Delaying Justice: The Supreme Court’s Decision to Hear Rearguments, 56
POL. RES. Q. 351, 355–57 (2003)). Citizens United is one such case. Id.
49. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
50. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
51. See infra Part II.A.
52. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i) (2006) (defining expenditure as “any purchase, payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by any person for
the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office”).
53. See infra Part II.A.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 83–106.
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legislatures and has acquiesced to these regulations.55 Although the Court
previously ruled that the government cannot place caps on campaign
expenditures on the basis of a speaker’s wealth 56 or limit corporate speech
on referenda to only those issues that affect corporate interests, 57 the Court
did not strike down corporate campaign expenditure regulations
specifically. 58
When squarely confronted with a restriction on corporate campaign
expenditures by a nonprofit organization, the Court did not find the
restrictions unconstitutional but instead carved out an exception for certain
corporate nonprofit organizations whose composition ensured that any
expenditures it made reflected actual public support for its political ideas.59
Building on this nonprofit exception, the Court created an antidistortion
rationale that justified corporate campaign restrictions on the ground that
corporate expenditures do not reflect actual public support for a
corporation’s political ideas and thus distort the political process.60
A. One of the Primary Purposes of the First Amendment Is to Protect
Political Speech
The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment with great fervor
to the protection of political speech and discussion. In 1966, in Mills v.
Alabama, 61 the Court found that a state statute imposing criminal sanctions
for the publication of editorials endorsing or opposing candidates on an
election day “flagrant[ly]” violated the First Amendment.62 In so holding,
the Court stated that “there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.” 63 This political discourse, the Court noted, includes
“discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner
in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters
relating to political processes.”64 Though the First Amendment fiercely
guards political speech generally, 65 the protection of free political speech is
55. See infra Part II.B.
56. See infra Part II.C.1.
57. See infra Part II.C.2.
58. See infra Part II.C.
59. See infra Part II.D.
60. See infra Part II.D.
61. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
62. Id. at 218−19.
63. Id. at 218.
64. Id. at 218–19.
65. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (“[T]he First
Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing
it.”).
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particularly salient in the context of elections for public office. In Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 66 the Court emphasized the unique position of campaign
speech under the First Amendment, stating that “it can hardly be doubted
that the [First Amendment] has its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”67
This vigorous protection of political speech is undergirded by the
Court’s protection of the marketplace of political speech in the interest of
promoting self-government. Protection of both speech and the press stems
from the Framers’ intent “to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”68
Moreover, Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California,69
suggested that public discussion is not merely permitted but represents a
“political duty,” and “that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people.” 70 This duty exists because public discussion of political ideas is a
means to an end, the end being the “discovery and spread of political
truth.” 71
Where the governmental interest underlying a restriction on funding
the production and dissemination of political speech is the suppression of
communication, the Court has stated that such a restriction is aimed at the
expressive element of spending, not the conduct. 72 Therefore, the Court in
Buckley v. Valeo applied the strict scrutiny standard of review to a provision
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) 73 that established

66. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
67. Id. at 271−72.
68. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The Roth Court derived this objective
from a 1774 letter sent by the Continental Congress to the residents of Quebec, which explained
that its decision to ensure the freedom of the press lies in “‘[t]he importance of . . . [the]
general . . . diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready
communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among
them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and just
modes of conducting affairs.’” Id.
69. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
70. Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (“[T]his Court has never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to
introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First
Amendment.”). The Buckley Court contrasted the making of campaign expenditures with the
burning of a draft card. Id. at 15−16. In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court
upheld a statute prohibiting the burning of a draft card. The Court found the statute to be a
restriction on conduct, not expression, because the governmental interest in protecting the draft
registration system was sufficiently justified and “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
73. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56
(2006)).
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political expenditure limits on individuals.74 In striking down the statute, 75
the Buckley Court stressed the political marketplace of ideas problem
presented by the statute, stating that “[a] restriction on the amount of money
a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.” 76
B. State Legislatures and Congress Responded to the Threat
Corporations Pose to the Democratic Process and the Supreme
Court Deferred to These Legislatures on Campaign Finance Laws
With the rise of corporate wealth over the last century came the
concern that corporate wealth would translate into inordinate corporate
power in the political arena. 77 Legislatures responded to these concerns by
passing corporate campaign financing restrictions, including restrictions on
both campaign contributions and campaign expenditures.78 The Supreme
Court granted considerable deference to the legislature in cases involving
First Amendment challenges. 79
1. Legislatures Have Responded to Urgent Calls to Address the
Threat Corporations Pose to the Political Process
Despite staunch protection of political speech under the First
Amendment, the rise of corporate political speech presented a pointed
problem for legislatures and the Court’s campaign speech jurisprudence. In
1894, Elihu Root, 80 addressing the Constitutional Convention of the State
of New York, advocated for legislation prohibiting political contributions
by corporations so as “‘to prevent . . . the great aggregations of wealth from
using their corporate funds, directly or indirectly, to send members of the
74. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7, 44–45 (explaining that the constitutionality of the statute
depended “on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting
scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression”). The
expenditure provision at issue in Buckley limited expenditures by “individuals or groups” to
$1,000 per candidate per election and by candidates themselves when using personal funds for
their campaigns. Id. at 7. See generally Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–56 (2006)) (amending
the FECA and establishing the specific expenditure limitations at issue in Buckley).
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45−49.
76. Id. at 19.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 80–82.
78. See infra Part II.B.1.
79. See infra Part II.B.2.
80. Root was a prominent statesman who served in several political offices, including
Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and United States Senator. Introductory Note to ELIHU
ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP, at vii (Robert Bacon & James Brown
Scott eds., 1916).
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legislature . . . to vote for their protection and the advancement of their
interests as against those of the public.’” 81 In 1905, President Theodore
Roosevelt, delivering his annual message to Congress, echoed Root’s
concerns, calling for legislation prohibiting “‘[a]ll contributions by
corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose’” to
stop “‘the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.’” 82
For over one hundred years, Congress repeatedly responded to the
concerns raised by Root, Roosevelt, and others by enacting legislation
designed to prevent the corrupting influence of corporate political
spending. 83 For example, the Tillman Act of 1907,84 precipitated by
President Roosevelt’s speech, prohibited corporate contributions of any
kind to any federal election. 85 Congress extended the prohibition on
contributions in 1925 by defining corporate contributions to include
“‘anything of value’” and imposing criminal sanctions for making or
accepting corporate contributions.86 In 1939, responding to the “enormous
financial outlays” made by unions “in connection with national
elections,” 87 Congress brought unions under campaign spending
regulations, restricting union contributions under the Hatch Act 88 and later
prohibiting union spending on federal elections entirely under the War
Labor Disputes Act of 1943. 89
The first restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures (as
distinguished from contributions 90) came in 1947 when Congress passed

81. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957) (quoting ROOT, supra note 80, at
143).
82. Id. at 572 (quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)).
83. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
84. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)),
invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
85. Id. Just a few years after passing the Tillman Act, Congress extended restrictions by
requiring federal candidates to provide financial disclosures before and after elections. FEC v.
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208−09 (1982).
86. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209 (quoting Federal Corrupt Practices Act of
1925, Pub. L. No. 68-506, §§ 302, 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1071, repealed by Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972)).
87. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Act of Aug. 2, 1939 (Hatch Act), ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified at scattered sections of 5
and 18 U.S.C. (2006)), amended by Act of July 19, 1940 (Hatch Act Amendments), ch. 640, 54
Stat. 767; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116.
89. War Labor Disputes Act (Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1943);
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209.
90. Contributions are donations made to political candidates, while expenditures are monies
spent to disseminate independent messages that advocate for the election or defeat of a political
candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i–ii) (2006) (defining contribution as “any gift, subscription,
loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office; or the payment by any person of compensation for the
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the Taft-Hartley Act, 91 which prohibited corporations and unions from
making campaign expenditures from their general treasuries in both primary
and general elections. 92 Though the Court did rule on cases in which
corporations and unions raised facial challenges to the constitutionality of
regulations on campaign contributions and expenditures, for decades the
Court did not decide these constitutional questions and instead rested the
cases on other grounds. 93 These opinions did, however, provide some
insight into how the Court might decide a facial challenge to campaign
expenditure prohibitions. For example, Justice Rutledge, concurring in
United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 94 stated that the
restrictions at issue targeted “the bloc power of unions” because unions had
made such large campaign expenditures that they had disproportionately
swayed political sentiment. 95 This targeting, Justice Rutledge explained,
stifled rights that are “essential to the full, fair and untrammeled operation
of the electoral process.” 96 In Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United
States, 97 the Court came to a more telling conclusion when it held that a
ban on union campaign expenditures 98 did not apply to expenditures made
from political funds financed through voluntary donations by employees, 99
thus drawing a clear distinction between monies given to the union

personal services of another person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for
any purpose”); supra note 52 (providing a definition of expenditure).
91. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947),
repealed and replaced by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 490 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 387–88, 400
(1972) (declining to decide whether the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947’s prohibitions
on contributions or expenditures by corporations and unions was unconstitutional); United States
v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 568, 589–93 (1957) (same); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106,
107–08 n.1, 110 (1948) (same).
94. 335 U.S. 106.
95. Id. at 143 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id. at 144.
97. 407 U.S. 385.
98. In Pipefitters, the Court discussed the ban on union campaign expenditures in the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947. Id. at 387−88, 427.
99. Id. at 409. The Court looked to § 205 of FECA for additional support for this conclusion.
Id. at 409. Section 205 makes it unlawful for unions to make a campaign expenditure using
“money or anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals” or
by “threat” of such action or by “monies required as a condition of membership in a labor
organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any commercial
transaction.” Id. at 409–10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (1972)).
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voluntarily for political purposes and those given for nonpolitical
purposes. 100
In the early 1970s, Congress expanded campaign spending regulation
once more by enacting the FECA, 101 legislation that the Court in Buckley
referred to as “‘by far the most comprehensive reform legislation [ever]
passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, VicePresident, and members of Congress.’” 102 By the end of that decade,
legislatures in more than thirty states had enacted restrictions on corporate
political activity, finding these restrictions “both politically desirable and
constitutionally permissible.” 103 Congress passed the BCRA 104 to further
restrict corporations from making expenditures except through political
action committees (“PACs”).105 The justification for these regulations was
generally the ability of unions and corporations to actually or apparently
cause political corruption and gain political clout by making excessively
large campaign contributions and expenditures.106
2.

The Supreme Court Granted Considerable Deference to
Legislatures on Corporate Campaign Finance Regulation

The Court afforded campaign finance regulation a considerable level
of deference throughout the wave of federal and state regulations from the
early 1900s through the 2000s. In FEC v. National Right to Work
Committee, 107 the Court stated that the “careful legislative adjustment of
the federal electoral laws, in a cautious advance, step by step, to account for

100. Nonpolitical purposes of the labor union fund at issue in Pipefitters included
“educational, . . . charity and defense purposes.” Id. at 394 n.6.
101. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20.
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (1975), rev’d in part by Buckley, 424 U.S. 1).
103. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822–23 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist commented that “such a broad consensus of
governmental bodies expressed over a period of many decades is entitled to considerable
deference from [the] Court.” Id. at 823.
104. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47
U.S.C. (2006)).
105. Id. Political action committees are funds that are independent of a corporation and are
used exclusively to collect campaign contribution and expenditure funds. See McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003) (defining PACs as “separate segregated funds . . . for election-related
contributions and expenditures”), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
106. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (“BCRA is the most recent federal enactment
designed ‘to purge national politics of what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of “big
money” campaign contributions.’” (quoting United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 572
(1957))).
107. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
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the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor
organizations warrants considerable deference.”108
In 2003, the Court in FEC v. Beaumont 109 echoed the deference
exhibited in National Right to Work, stating that the Court’s “cases on
campaign finance regulation represent respect for . . . legislative
judgment.” 110 In holding that FECA’s restriction on nonprofit advocacy
111

corporations was permissible under the First Amendment, Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, opened by noting, “Since 1907, federal law has
barred corporations from contributing directly to candidates for federal
112
office.”
The Court stressed the strong support behind the law at issue,
describing the “century of congressional efforts” that went into carefully
113
crafting a prohibition on corporate political spending.
Describing cases
in which it upheld such prohibitions, the Court demonstrated that these
114
Finally, to
congressional efforts also had a history of judicial support.
clarify that the Court’s respect for legislative restrictions on corporate
political spending was not a mere rubberstamp, the Court stated that
“deference to legislative choice is warranted,” especially with respect to
115
campaign contributions.
Notably, the Court in National Right to Work deemed Congress’s
finding that corporations and unions posed dangers to the electoral process
sufficient justification for regulating the contributions of those entities.116
These dangers included both actual corruption and the appearance of
corruption and the corporate form’s potential to exert improper influence on
the political process. 117 Additionally, the National Right to Work Court
emphasized the strength of its deference to Congress on corporate campaign
finance regulation, declining to “second-guess a legislative determination as
108. Id. at 209 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
110. Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted). But see United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106,
130 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result) (arguing that the majority, in avoiding deciding
questions of constitutionality, misconstrued and effectively rewrote the statute, which the Court
should have found “patently invalid as applied”); see also UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. at 593 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the restrictions on corporate and union speech are violations of the
First Amendment).
111. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 149. The restriction at issue in Beaumont was FECA’s restriction
on any corporation attempting to make contributions or expenditures in relation to certain federal
elections. Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 321, 90 Stat. 490, 490–92 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 441b (2006))).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 152–53.
114. Id. at 153–55.
115. Id. at 155 (reasoning that corporate campaign contributions are a “plain threat to political
integrity”).
116. FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982).
117. Id. at 209–10.

2011]

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEC

63

to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil
feared.” 118 In granting such great deference to Congress, the Court relied
upon its finding in California Medical Association v. FEC 119 that “the
differing structures and purposes of different entities may require different
forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral
process.” 120
C. Regulation Based on the Speaker’s Wealth or a Corporate
Speaker’s Business Interests Is Unconstitutional
In the late 1970s, the Court issued two opinions addressing the
constitutionality of statutes that restricted campaign expenditures. The first
of these opinions, Buckley v. Valeo, established the principle that a
campaign expenditure restriction based on a speaker’s wealth is a violation
of the First Amendment’s free speech protection. 121 The Buckley Court,
however, faced a blanket limitation on campaign expenditures, not a
limitation specific to corporate or union expenditures. 122 Shortly thereafter,
in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court struck down a statute
that restricted corporate speech on referenda if the referenda did not
materially affect the corporation.123
1.

The Buckley Court Prohibited Campaign Expenditure
Restrictions Based on the Speaker’s Wealth

In Buckley, the Court addressed the constitutionality of various
provisions of FECA, including the Act’s limits on campaign expenditures
made by individuals or groups that are “‘relative to a clearly identifiable
candidate.’” 124 The Court in Buckley considered two FECA provisions:
one that set campaign expenditure limits and another that set limits on
political contributions by groups or individuals. 125 Under either provision,
the Court found that “the quantity of expression[,] . . . the number of issues
118. Id. at 210.
119. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
120. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 210 (quoting Cal. Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 201)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In National Right to Work, the Court noted that its decision
was consistent with Bellotti because the Bellotti Court stated that its decision did not evaluate the
constitutionality of laws prohibiting corporate influence over candidate elections. Id. at 210 n.7
(citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978)); see also infra Part
II.C.2.
121. See infra Part II.C.1.
122. See infra Part II.C.1.
123. See infra Part II.C.2.
124. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6, 13 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431–56 (2006))).
125. Id. at 13 & n.12.
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discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached” in the context of a political campaign was necessarily reduced.126
Recognizing that both provisions therefore implicated First Amendment
interests, the Court drew a distinction between the provisions on the basis of
the degree of restriction that each placed on an individual’s or group’s
freedom of expression and association, finding that expenditure limits
placed a substantially more severe limitation on the freedoms of political
expression and association than contribution limits.127
The Court in Buckley found the governmental interest in preventing
corruption adequate to sustain the statute’s contribution limits. 128 The
Court grounded its holding in the governmental interest in preventing actual
or apparent quid pro quo 129 corruption. 130 The Court noted, however, that
Congress was permitted to address not only the threat posed by quid pro
quo corruption but also the broader threat posed by politicians who are too
compliant with large contributors. 131 Conversely, the Court struck down

126. Id. at 19. The Court reasoned that a restriction on spending during a political campaign
necessarily restricts political speech “because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.” Id.
127. Id. at 23. Limitations on campaign contributions, according to the Buckley Court, place
“only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication” of
political speech. Id. at 20–21. Contributions provide only a rough indicator of a contributor’s
support for a candidate and are merely “symbolic expression[s] of support.” Id. at 21. More
importantly, a contribution is not speech by the contributor per se but is transformed into speech
by others. See id. (“While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate
or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political
debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor.”).
128. See id. at 29 (finding that “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial
contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First
Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling”). Thirty years after Buckley, the
Court qualified its holding by striking down a Vermont statute that set contribution limits so low
that they threatened the viability of political campaigns. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230,
261–62 (2006) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Vermont statute “goes too far” because “its
contribution limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation in campaigns
through volunteer activities; and they are not indexed for inflation”).
129. Quid pro quo corruption is the receipt of money, as contributions or expenditures, in cases
of campaign speech, in exchange for improper commitments from a political candidate. Buckley,
424 U.S. at 47.
130. Id. at 26–27. Stressing the importance of fundraising to the execution of a successful
campaign and the threat that political quid pro quo presents to democracy, the Buckley Court
found the need to prevent actual quid pro quo corruption to be quite clear. See id. (stating that
actual corruption is not an illusory problem and citing the 1972 presidential election Watergate
scandal as a particularly glaring example). The Court also recognized that the appearance of
corruption—the “public awareness” of the possibility of corruption stemming from large
campaign contributions—is almost as great a concern as actual corruption because apparent
corruption could erode public confidence in our representative democracy. Id. at 27.
131. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 28) (stating that the Buckley Court recognized “that the Congress could constitutionally address
the power of money ‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and specific’ than
bribery”).
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the statute’s limits on campaign expenditures by groups and individuals,
finding the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption insufficient justification for such restrictions.132
The Court found that the danger of quid pro quo corruption was alleviated
in the case of expenditures because expenditures do not entail coordination
with the political candidate. 133
The Buckley Court also established a key campaign finance regulation
doctrine: The government may not impose regulations on speech in the
interest of “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections.” 134 Buckley rejected any possibility
that the government could restrict political speech on the basis of an
equalization interest, arguing that such an interest unjustifiably inhibits the
political marketplace of ideas.135 Relying upon its reasoning in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 136 the Court in Buckley found that equalization is
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment,” as that Amendment was drafted
“to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources and to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”137
Specifically identifying campaign expenditures as speech,138 the Court
stated that the First Amendment’s freedom of speech provisions “cannot
properly be made to depend on a person’s financial ability to engage in
public discussion.” 139 Notably, in its holdings on campaign expenditures,
the Court did not distinguish among various “individuals” and “groups” for
140
First Amendment freedom of speech purposes.
2. The Government Cannot Restrict Corporate Political Speech
Based on Corporate Interests and Identity
In 1978, the Bellotti Court,
unconstitutional a statute that
campaign expenditures related to
interests of the corporation. 141

following on the heels of Buckley, held
prohibited corporations from making
referenda that did not affect the material
Specifically, the Court addressed the

132. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
133. Id. at 47.
134. Id. at 48–49.
135. See id. at 48–49.
136. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 266, 269).
138. Id. at 16−19.
139. Id. at 49.
140. See id. at 39–51 (discussing the constitutionality of campaign expenditure restrictions
without differentiating between restrictions on individuals and restrictions on groups).
141. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68, 776 (1978).
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constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that prohibited certain
businesses from making expenditures “‘for the purpose of . . . influencing
or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one
materially affecting any of the property, businesses or assets of the
corporation.’” 142 The statute at issue in Bellotti also provided that “‘[n]o
question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially
to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation,’” thus
precluding the businesses from making independent expenditures relative to
these issues. 143
In reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that “[t]he inherent worth
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source,” and moreover, that political speech
is the very type of speech that is essential to democratic decision
making. 144 Therefore, the fact that the government has determined that a
corporation has no material interest in a referendum does not dampen the
capacity of that corporation to inform the public on that referendum. 145
Acknowledging the divisive role that the corporate identity plays in
campaign finance regulation, the Court stated that “[i]f the speakers here
were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence
their proposed speech.” 146 The Court also stressed that the First
Amendment protects speech that is highly persuasive as much as it protects
speech that is unpersuasive. 147 Thus, the fact that a corporation’s political
speech has substantial sway in the political marketplace is an impermissible
basis for restricting that speech.148
The Court turned next to the section of the statute that permitted
corporations to make expenditures should a referendum “materially affect”
the corporation. 149 The Court found that the statute was “an impermissible
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests”
proffered by a speaker if that speaker were unable to prove a substantial

142. Id. at 768 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West
Supp. 1977)).
143. Id. at 767–68 (alteration in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8).
144. Id. at 777.
145. See id. at 776−77 (noting that while “[t]he importance of the referendum issue to the
people and government of Massachusetts is not disputed,” the merits of the referendum “are the
subject of sharp disagreement,” and suggesting that the corporation’s speech may have a “capacity
for informing the public” on the referendum issue).
146. Id. at 777. The Court characterized campaign speech as “the type of speech indispensable
to decisionmaking in a democracy.” Id.
147. Id. at 790.
148. See id. (“[T]he fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to
suppress it . . . .”).
149. Id. at 784.

2011]

CITIZENS UNITED v. FEC

67

interest in a particular subject.150 In so finding, the Court did not draw a
clear distinction between corporate identity discrimination and corporate
interest discrimination.
Though blanket restrictions on campaign expenditures like the
restriction at issue in Buckley are subject to strict scrutiny, 151 restrictions
based on the characteristics of a particular speaker or on the context of the
speech are not foreclosed by the Court’s jurisprudence. In Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 152 the Court
stated that differential treatment of speakers is suspect “unless justified by
some special characteristic” of the regulated class.153 Moreover, the rights
of certain speakers may turn on the context of the speech. For example, in
the school context, a student’s right to speak may not be “‘automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings’” because the context
requires limitation of those rights. 154
Additional examples of
constitutionally permissible identity-based restrictions include restrictions
on the speech rights of prisoners, 155 foreigners, 156 government
employees, 157 and members of the military. 158

150. Id.
151. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam). Because expenditure
limitations impose a large burden on the freedom of speech and association, the governmental
interests underlying the limitations are subject to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations
on core First Amendment rights of political expression.” Id.
152. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
153. See id. at 585, 591 (holding that a Minnesota tax on ink and paper violated the First
Amendment because “it single[d] out the press, . . . target[ed] a small group of newspapers,” and
no special characteristic of the press justified the tax).
154. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
155. See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (stating
that the First Amendment rights of inmates are limited by “the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system” and the involuntary nature of incarceration, which sets prisons apart from
normal society (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals from making
contributions or expenditures toward a federal, state, or local election).
157. See, e.g., U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Assoc. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554,
556 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act’s prohibition on executive branch employees “taking an
active part in political management or political campaigns”).
158. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (stating that the unique “character of
the military community and of the military mission” permits the differential treatment of members
of the military under the First Amendment).
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D. The Court Created an Exception for Certain Nonprofit
Corporations Whose Expenditures Reflected Actual Political
Support for Its Speech, and It Subsequently Built Its Antidistortion
Rationale from This Reasoning
In the 1980s, the Court began to clearly articulate and uphold the
government’s interest in restricting corporate campaign expenditures—to
ensure that political speech reflected the actual views of those persons
whose money was used to propagate the speech. In 1986, the Court, in
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (“MCFL”), ruled on an asapplied challenge to Section 316 of FECA, which specifically “prohibits
corporations from using [general] treasury funds to make an expenditure ‘in
connection with’ any federal election.” 159 Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(“MCFL”) is “a nonprofit, nonstock corporation” that used its general
treasury funds to make an expenditure affecting a federal election rather
than making its expenditure using contributions drawn from a segregated
fund established for political purposes.160 The Court held that the
restriction on the use of the general treasury to make campaign expenditures
was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL and in doing so established a
three-prong exception—the MCFL exception—to FECA’s prohibition on
corporate expenditures using general treasury funds. 161 To satisfy the
exception, a corporation must (1) be “formed for the express purpose of
promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities,” (2)
have no shareholders or other persons with claims to the corporation’s
“assets or earnings,” and (3) not accept contributions from businesses
corporations or labor unions. 162
The MCFL exception derived from the governmental interest that was
a primary driver of campaign finance reform: preventing “the corrosive
influence of concentrated corporate wealth” from affecting “the integrity of
the marketplace of political ideas.” 163 The Court, however, did not find

159. 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986) (quoting Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 316, 90 Stat. 475, 490 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006),
invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
160. Id. This separate, segregated fund would constitute a PAC. For a definition of PACs, see
supra note 105.
161. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–64.
162. Id. at 264.
163. Id. at 257. In assessing the FEC’s argument that the application of FECA § 316 to MCFL
was permissible, the Court briefly described its extensive history of permitting corporate
campaign finance regulation. Id. This history includes permitting the restriction of “political war
chests” amassed using the corporate form, FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 501 (1985), permitting restrictions in the interest of eliminating the impact of
aggregated corporate wealth on federal elections, Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United
States, 407 U.S. 385, 416 (1972), stemming the influence of “large aggregations of capital,”
United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957), and regulating money amassed due to the
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this interest sufficient to support a restriction on corporate campaign
expenditures where the corporation met the Court’s three-prong test.164
Though the MCFL Court may have appeared to lean toward supporting an
equalization rationale because it supported legislative restrictions on the
political speech of wealthy corporations that threatened to drown out the
voices of others, 165 it explicitly disavowed such a justification, stating that
“[p]olitical ‘free trade’ does not necessarily require that all who participate
in the political marketplace do so with exactly equal resources.” 166 Rather,
the MCFL Court found that political expenditures from a corporation’s
general treasury do not necessarily reflect “popular support for the
corporation’s political ideas,” but instead merely reflect “the economically
motivated decisions of investors and customers.” 167 Thus, corporate
resources create the risk of a corporation becoming “a formidable political
presence,” despite the fact that a corporation’s political ideas likely have no
foundation in actual public support.168 In sum, wealth itself is not the
problem: The problem is that wealth amassed by a corporation and spent on
campaign expenditures does not reflect actual public support for the
expenditures.
As the MCFL Court explained, FECA’s PAC provisions prevent
corporate resource dominance in the political marketplace by ensuring that
a corporation promulgates its political ideas using a fund that “in fact
reflect[s] popular support for the [corporation’s] political positions.”169
This interest is tied to protecting the integrity of the political marketplace of
ideas because it ensures that competition in the marketplace “is truly
competition among ideas.” 170 Massachusetts Citizens for Life was granted
an exception under FECA specifically because the three characteristics

benefits that accompany the corporate form, FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
207 (1982).
164. See MCFL, 479 U.S. at 256–63 (explaining how MCFL’s satisfaction of the three-factor
test eliminates the concerns that underlie the corporate expenditure restriction).
165. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
166. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 258.
168. See id. (explaining that “the power of the corporation”—its corporate resources—“may be
no reflection of the power of its ideas”).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 259. The Court’s reverence for the protection of the marketplace of ideas under the
First Amendment can be traced back to Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) in which he championed an open marketplace, stating,
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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outlined by the Court 171 ensure that MCFL and other exempt corporations
do not pose a threat to the integrity of the political marketplace.
In 1990, the Court used its reasoning in MCFL to articulate an
antidistortion rationale for regulating corporate campaign expenditures.
Faced with a state statute that prohibited corporations from using corporate
treasury funds to make expenditures in relation to a candidate for state
office, the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce used the
MCFL reasoning to formulate and define the governmental interest in
preventing corporate wealth from distorting the political marketplace.172
This governmental antidistortion interest, according to the Austin Court,
“aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”173
As did the Court in MCFL, 174 the Court in Austin clarified that the statute it
held constitutional did not attempt “to equalize the relative influence of
speakers on elections” 175 but rather “ensure[d] that expenditures reflect
actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.” 176
Applying this antidistortion rationale to the operation of the statute at
issue, the Court held that the restriction on corporate expenditures was
constitutional. 177 The Court acknowledged that the corporate identity of
the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce did not remove it from First
Amendment protections.178 Nevertheless, the Court applied the MCFL
reasoning in upholding the statute, stating that the “state-created
advantages” of the corporate form permit corporations to “obtain an unfair

171. See supra text accompanying notes 161–162.
172. 494 U.S. 652, 654, 658–60 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
173. Id. at 659−60. The Court noted that the statute in question did permit corporations to
establish segregated funds specifically for raising monies earmarked for political expenditures,
which ensures, like the MCFL exception, that the speech generated by the fund actually reflects
contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views. Id. at 660–61.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 165−166.
175. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (internal quotation marks omitted). But see id. at 705 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that the government has a legitimate interest in restricting the
quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections is antithetical to the
First Amendment.”); id. at 683−84 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority in Austin
effectively adopted an equalization rationale that has no logical foundation because corporations
are prohibited from spending amassed wealth on expenditures while wealthy individuals can
spend without limit).
176. Id. at 660 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 655.
178. Id. at 657 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
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advantage in the political marketplace.”179 The Court explicitly pointed to
the misuse of the state-conferred advantages to potentially corrupt politics
though the use of “political war chests funneled through the corporate
form.” 180
Applying Austin’s antidistortion rationale and the Court’s prior
opinions, which afford great deference to the legislature’s judgment in
campaign finance law, 181 in the 2003 case McConnell v. FEC, the Court
upheld BCRA’s Section 203 prohibitions on the use of corporate general
treasuries to make campaign expenditures.182 The Court recognized that
since Buckley, Congress’s power to ban corporations from using general
treasury funds to finance campaign expenditures “has been firmly
embedded in our law.” 183 In finding that BCRA Section 203 was not a
complete ban, the Court emphasized the important role that PACs play in
corporate political speech. 184 Quoting its opinion in FEC v. Beaumont, the
Court noted that PACs allow corporations to engage in political speech
“without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence” that
may not align with the interests of the corporation’s shareholders.185 Thus,
prior to Citizens United, restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures
were firmly embedded in the law, and the Court had not overturned any
laws that barred corporations from making campaign expenditures using
general treasury funds.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Citizens United v. FEC, 186 the United States Supreme Court
overruled its earlier rulings in Austin and McConnell, holding that the
government may not suppress political speech on the basis of a speaker’s
corporate identity, that the government cannot restrict expenditures for
electioneering communications, and that BCRA Section 203’s ban on
corporate campaign expenditures is unconstitutional.187 The Court further

179. Id. at 658−59 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
180. Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 108–120.
182. 540 U.S. 93, 204–07 (2003).
183. Id. at 203.
184. See id. at 203–04 (“The ability to form and administer separate segregated funds . . . has
provided corporations and unions with a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in
express advocacy.”).
185. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
186. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
187. Id. at 913, 917.
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held that BCRA’s disclosure and disclaimer provisions were constitutional
as applied to the film Hillary. 188
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy first attempted to resolve the
case on narrower grounds by addressing whether Section 203 was
unconstitutional as applied to Hillary. 189 After determining that Hillary fell
within the BCRA’s definition of electioneering communication, 190 Justice
Kennedy applied the WRTL test for the functional equivalent of express
advocacy. 191 The WRTL test provides that “a court should find that [a
communication] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if [it]
is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate.” 192 In light of Hillary’s extended
criticism of then-Senator Clinton, the majority determined that the movie
could be reasonably interpreted as nothing other than “an appeal to vote
against Senator Clinton,” and that Hillary was therefore the functional
equivalent of express advocacy. 193 Upon finding that Citizens United did
not fall under the MCFL nonprofit exception to Section 203, 194 the majority
found that Hillary fell squarely within BCRA’s prohibition on corporate
electioneering communications and so rejected Citizens United’s as-applied
challenge. 195
Justice Kennedy then turned to Citizens United’s facial challenge to
BCRA Section 203. 196
The Court concluded that Section 203’s
independent expenditure prohibition “is an outright ban” on political
speech, a set of “onerous restrictions” akin to the sort of sixteenth and
seventeenth century English laws “the First Amendment was drawn to
prohibit.” 197 The majority rejected the argument that corporations can
make expenditures via PACs, finding that PACs do not provide a sufficient
means of engaging in campaign expenditures because they are independent

188. Id. at 916–17.
189. Id. at 888.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 889.
192. Id. at 889–90 (alterations in original) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 469–70 (2007)).
193. Id. at 890.
194. Id. at 891 (“Citizens United does not qualify for the MCFL exemption . . . since some
funds used to make the movie were donations from for-profit corporations.”).
195. Id. at 889−90. The Court also rejected Citizens United’s claims that § 203 is invalid as
applied to video-on-demand distribution, declining “to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines
based on the particular media or technology” used for political speech. Id. at 890–91. Video-ondemand services permit digital cable customers “to select programming from various menus,
including movies, television shows, sports, news, and music . . . and watch the program at any
time” they prefer, with the ability to “rewind or pause the program.” Id. at 887.
196. Id. at 892.
197. Id. at 895–97.
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of corporations. 198 Section 203, according to Justice Kennedy, failed the
strict scrutiny test because the Government had shown no compelling
interest in restricting corporations and unions as speakers.199 Justice
Kennedy further asserted that because “[t]he First Amendment protects
speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each,” the Government
cannot impose speech restrictions based on corporate identity. 200 To shore
up this assertion, the Court listed examples of cases in which the Court
recognized that First Amendment protection applies to corporations, relying
primarily on Buckley and Bellotti. 201
Justice Kennedy then characterized Austin as a departure from the
Court’s history of acknowledging the unconstitutionality of corporate
campaign expenditure restrictions.202
The Court rebuffed Austin’s
antidistortion rationale on the ground that Buckley had rejected the notion
that the government may restrict corporate political speech in an effort to
equalize the marketplace of ideas. 203 Furthermore, the majority concluded
that the government’s antidistortion rationale was undercut by the fact that
most corporations are actually small corporations whose receipts total less
than one million dollars per year. 204 Applying the Buckley Court’s
anticorruption rationale to Section 203’s independent expenditure limits, the
majority found that the rationale did not justify these limits because they
extended far beyond the government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption, which the majority concluded was the only governmental

198. See id. at 897 (describing the burdensome red tape associated with the operation of a
PAC).
199. Id. at 898−99.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. See id. at 899–903. The Court explained that the Buckley Court invalidated § 608(e)’s
expenditure restrictions, which applied to both individuals and corporations, but that Buckley in no
way suggested that the restrictions would have been constitutional if placed only on corporations.
Id. at 902 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23, 39 n.45, 50 (1976) (per curiam)). Similarly,
Bellotti, the Court stated, confirmed First Amendment protection of corporations when it struck
down a state law that prohibited corporate expenditures on referenda issues. Id.
202. Id. at 903.
203. Id. at 904. Moreover, the Court stated that “[i]t is irrelevant for purposes of the First
Amendment that corporate funds may ‘have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
corporation’s political ideas.’” Id. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 660 (1990)). The Court also warned that the antidistortion rationale would inevitably
lead to Congress banning the “political speech of media corporations” without constitutional
concern. Id. (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 283 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part) (“The chilling endpoint of the Court’s
reasoning is not difficult to foresee: outright regulation of the press.”)).
204. Id. at 907. The Court reasoned that the statute could not in fact target amassed wealth
because three quarters of corporations subject to federal income tax bring in less than one million
dollars in receipts each year. Id.
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interest that could sustain a restriction on campaign expenditures.205
Furthermore, the Court stated that “it is our law and our tradition that more
speech, not less, is the governing rule,” and thus an “outright ban” on
corporate political speech is not an appropriate remedy for real or apparent
corruption. 206 The majority concluded that Austin and the part of
McConnell that upheld Section 203’s restrictions on corporate independent
expenditures must be overruled, and that the Court must “return to the
principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate
identity.” 207
Finally, the majority determined that the Section 201 and Section 311
disclosure and disclaimer requirements were not unconstitutional facially or
as applied to Hillary. 208 In so holding, Justice Kennedy relied on two
pieces of precedent: (1) Buckley’s support of the government’s interest in
informing the public about the source of election spending; and (2)
McConnell’s application of this interest to uphold Sections 201 and 311
against facial challenges. 209 Though the McConnell Court recognized that
Section 201’s disclosure requirements would be unconstitutional as applied
to a particular organization if the disclosures were likely to lead to threats
and reprisals against its members, the Court found that Citizens United had
produced no evidence showing that its satisfaction of the requirements
would lead to such a result. 210
Justice Thomas joined all of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
except for the part upholding Sections 201 and 311 both facially and as
applied to Hillary. 211 Finding the BCRA’s disclosure and disclaimer
requirements unconstitutional, Justice Thomas argued that political speech
is entitled to more robust protection in the face of evidence of threats and
retaliation against certain donors and that political speech is unduly chilled
where courts only handle these cases on an as-applied basis. 212

205. See id. at 908–11. The Court also rejected the shareholder protection and prevention of
foreign influence rationales. Id. at 911.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 913. To justify its departure from stare decisis, the Court stated that Austin
abandoned established First Amendment principles and was undermined by subsequent
experience and “[r]apid changes in technology,” and asserted that there was no compelling
reliance interest at stake in its overruling. Id. at 912–13.
208. Id. at 913–14.
209. Id. at 914.
210. Id. at 916.
211. Id. at 979 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. See id. at 980–82 (“I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens
of this Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and
threatening warning letters as the price for engaging in core political speech, the primary object of
First Amendment protection.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Alito joined, to elaborate on the majority’s justification for departing from
stare decisis. 213 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the Court had properly
abandoned Austin because it “departed from the robust protections [the
Court] had granted political speech in [its] earlier cases,” its value as
precedent had weakened over time and in light of controversy surrounding
the decision, and it threatened to permit government prohibition of speech
in the interest of equalizing political voices. 214
Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito
joined and Justice Thomas joined in part, criticizing Justice Steven’s dissent
for failing to show in his discussion of “Original Understandings” that the
Framers did not intend to protect corporate speech. 215 Instead, Justice
Scalia argued, the Framers intended for the First Amendment freedom of
speech to extend to both individuals speaking alone and individuals
speaking in association with others, with the latter of these two classes of
protected speakers including corporations. 216
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice
Sotomayor, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part (“the
dissent”). 217 The real question in this case, the dissent believed,
“concern[ed] how, not if, [Citizens United] may finance its electioneering”
communications. 218 Justice Stevens argued that the BCRA does not ban
corporations from promulgating political speech, as the majority claimed,
but only imposes justified restrictions on corporate speakers. 219
Justice Stevens opened by explaining that the majority improperly
raised the issue of whether to overrule Austin and, effectively, McConnell
sua sponte when the Court could have decided the case on narrower
grounds. 220 Additionally, the dissent claimed, the majority departed from
stare decisis without satisfying any standard for doing so. 221
213. See id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
214. Id. at 921–22.
215. Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 928–29.
217. Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218. Id.
219. See generally id. at 961–79.
220. See id. at 931–38. Citizens United, Justices Stevens noted, abandoned its facial challenge
to § 203 in its motion for summary judgment, “and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of that
claim.” Id. at 931. Justice Stevens argued that the majority’s resurrection of the claim was both
“a technical defect” and a departure from “‘the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that
courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts
to which it is to be applied.’” Id. at 932–33 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)). Justice Stevens noted the following alternative
paths to deciding the case on narrower grounds: (1) determine that a movie distributed by videoon-demand is not an electioneering communication under § 203; (2) “expand[] the MCFL
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The dissent characterized Section 203 not as a ban on corporate
political speech but as a narrow restriction justified by anticorruption,
antidistortion, and shareholder protection rationales.222 Like the disclosure
and disclaimer requirements, Justice Stevens argued, the Section 203
restrictions and PAC exceptions impose a justified burden on corporate
speech. 223 According to the dissent, the Court had previously upheld
identity-based restrictions such as these in a variety of circumstances on the
basis of compelling government interests. 224 Justice Stevens argued that
political speech restrictions based on corporate identity are constitutionally
sound because the Framers intended the First Amendment right to free
speech to extend to individuals, not corporations.225 The dissent used the
history of campaign finance reform and the Court’s corporate campaign
finance jurisprudence to support this historical interpretation.226 Justice
Stevens noted that, at the time the First Amendment was drafted, “the term
‘speech’ referred to oral communication by individuals,” such that
corporations, which “were conceived of as artificial entities” lacking “the
technical capacity to ‘speak,’” could not plausibly have been encompassed
in the Framer’s concept of freedom of speech. 227
Justice Stevens then cited an extensive record of corruption that he
argued provided the basis for the government’s anticorruption interest and,
by extension, Austin’s antidistortion rationale.228 Finally, the dissent

exemption to cover § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that accept only . . . de minimis [contributions] from
for-profit corporations”; or (3) find that Citizens United falls within the MCFL exception, as
“Citizens United looks so much like the MCFL organizations [the Court has] exempted from
regulation” in the past. Id. at 937–38.
221. See id. at 938–42 (rejecting reliance, antiquity, and workability as justifications for the
majority’s departure from stare decisis).
222. See id. at 961–79. Shareholder protection is the governmental interest in ensuring that
shareholders are not made to pay for political speech that they do not support themselves. See
infra text accompanying note 229.
223. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 942–43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
224. Id. at 945–46. Justice Stevens cited government restrictions on the speech rights of
“students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees.” Id. at
945 & n.41 (citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (students)); id.
at 945 & n.42 (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977)
(prisoners)); id at 945 & n.43 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (members of the
Armed Forces)); id. at 945 & n.44 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (foreign nationals)); id. at 945 &
n.45 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554, 556 (1973) (federal
government employees)).
225. Id. at 949−50.
226. See id. at 952–61 (extensively detailing the legislative and jurisprudential histories of
campaign finance law).
227. Id. at 950 n.55.
228. Id. at 961–70. Justice Stevens argued that the Austin antidistortion rationale is essentially
an anticorruption rationale that is specifically tied to unique considerations relevant to
corporations. Id. at 970.
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maintained that Section 203 actually protects First Amendment values by
protecting shareholders from having to “effectively foot[] the bill” for
political speech that they may or may not support. 229
IV. ANALYSIS
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court wrongly concluded that
banning the use of corporate and union general treasuries to fund speech
that advocates for the election or defeat of a political candidate violates the
230
First Amendment.
Contrary to the majority’s contention, Citizens
United did not bring the Court back to its rulings in Buckley and Bellotti231
but instead took a sharp turn away from the Court’s history of recognizing
the government’s anticorruption interests and its tradition of granting
deference to the legislature on campaign finance reform. 232 Indeed, the
Court failed to recognize that Buckley and Bellotti cannot be so readily
extrapolated to apply to the corporate expenditure restrictions at issue in
Citizens United, as the reasoning in those cases is far more nuanced than the
Court’s opinion suggests. 233 By misconstruing Buckley and Bellotti, the
Court also characterized Austin as an outlier, when in fact Austin accords
with these cases and is a logical extension of the Citizens United Court’s
reasoning in MCFL. 234 Finally, in striking down BCRA Section 203’s235
restrictions on corporate expenditures, the Court opened the door for
throngs of so-called phantom speakers to enter the political marketplace.236
A. Citizens United Took a Sharp Turn Away from the Court’s LongStanding History of Acknowledging a Governmental Interest in
Combating Actual and Apparent Corruption
The majority in Citizens United failed to give sufficient weight to the
governmental interest in preventing corruption. 237
Corruption has

229. Id. at 977–79.
230. Id. at 886–87, 896–97, 913 (majority opinion).
231. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
232. See infra Part IV.A.
233. See infra Part IV.B.
234. See infra Part IV.C.
235. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006), invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
236. See infra Part IV.D.
237. Perhaps pursuing a governmental interest in preventing corruption by limiting campaign
expenditures is a futile endeavor. Scholars have argued that the system of campaign financing is
“hydraulic” in nature—that money always finds a pathway into campaigns—and so the problem
of money and politics is simply intractable. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124
HARV. L. REV. 118, 120 (2010) (citing Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999)) (noting that political money has
used outlets such as PACs to circumvent the regulatory system).
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infiltrated politics via corporate contributions and expenditures in two
distinct ways: (1) actual corruption wherein corporate political spending
directly influenced politicians and policy; and (2) apparent political
corruption, which eroded the American public’s trust in its government.238
The majority in Citizens United failed to fully address these modes of
corruption because it mistakenly used dicta from Buckley to find that the
only governmental interest that can sustain a campaign expenditure
restriction is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption. 239
Numerous instances of quid pro quo corruption have been documented
throughout this nation’s history. 240 In the 1830s, banks and corporations
began making sizable donations to political parties in an effort to sway
policy in their favor. 241 They did not limit their efforts to contributions.
When Andrew Jackson “declared himself an enemy of the Bank of the
United States,” the president of the bank spent $42,000 to conduct a
campaign against Jackson, a candidate in the 1832 presidential election.242
In response to this long history and riding the tide of anger over the
Watergate scandal, Congress passed the 1974 FECA amendments,
tightening restrictions on campaign finance.243
Despite FECA’s restrictions on contributions, corporations were able
to skirt these restrictions throughout the 1980s and 1990s by making
expenditures for “issue advocacy.”
Issue advocacy involves those
expenditures for political speech that avoid the use of “magic words”
identified in Buckley to represent express advocacy for a candidate’s
election or defeat, and thus avoid contribution limits. 244 Throughout
election cycles in the 1990s and in the 2000 election cycle, corporations
238. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–60, 622–25 (D.D.C.) (per curiam)
(opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (analyzing numerous examples of the corrupting influence of
corporate expenditures on politics in the years prior to BCRA’s passage), judgment rev’d in part
by 540 U.S. 93 (2003). But see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (“The McConnell record was
over 100,000 pages long, yet it does not have any direct examples of votes being exchanged
for . . . expenditures.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
239. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was
limited to quid pro quo corruption.”).
240. See, e.g., MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
AND THE COURTS 5–11 (2005) (providing numerous examples of quid pro quo corruption among
politicians and corporations dating back to the late 1700s).
241. Id. at 7.
242. Id. Jackson prevailed and later did close the bank. Id.
243. Id. at 46.
244. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Buckley
identified “Elect John Smith” or “Vote Against Jane Doe” as “magic words” that constituted
express, rather than issue, advocacy. Id. Issue advocacy avoids such words so that the related
campaign speech cannot be classified as an express call to vote for or against a candidate, thus
skirting FECA restrictions. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam)).
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spent millions of dollars from their general treasuries on issue
advertisements, scheduled them to air close to primary and general
elections, and even used misleading names that resembled grassroots
organizations to conceal the identity of corporate speakers.245 Where
corporations make campaign expenditures under the guise of a grassroots
organization, the disclosure and disclaimer requirements that the majority
upheld in Citizens United 246 will be of little use in ensuring that the public
is properly informed of the identity of a political speaker.
The majority in Citizens United brushed aside these clear examples of
corruption by oversimplifying Buckley. The Court concluded that Buckley
only permitted campaign finance restrictions if the governmental interest
was to prevent quid pro quo corruption, 247 yet in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
248

Government PAC, the Court had stated that Buckley did not, in fact, limit
permissible governmental interests in restricting campaign finance to only
the prevention of quid pro quo corruption. 249 Indeed, Buckley expressly
stated that quid pro quo corruption is the most blatant form of corruption,
but that Congress is certainly permitted to restrict spending where even the
appearance of corruption was of concern.250
B. The Citizens United Court Mistakenly Extrapolated the Reasoning
in Buckley and Bellotti to Strike Restrictions on Corporate
Campaign Speech
The majority in Citizens United incorrectly took the holdings and
reasoning in both Buckley and Bellotti and extrapolated from them to reach
the erroneous conclusion that these cases prohibited the government from
regulating corporate expenditures. Both Buckley and Bellotti, however,
addressed statutes that were distinguishable from BCRA’s Section 203 ban

245. Id. at 127–28. For example, Citizens for Better Medicare “was not a grassroots
organization of citizens, as its name might suggest,” but instead was the misleading platform of
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of drug manufacturers.
Id. at 128 & n.22.
246. See supra text accompanying note 209.
247. See supra text accompanying note 205.
248. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
249. See id. at 389 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28) (“In [Buckley], we recognized a concern not
confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”).
250. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27−28 (acknowledging that “the giving and taking of bribes deal
with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental
action,” and commenting that “Congress was surely entitled to conclude that . . . contribution
ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of
corruption inherent in [the] system”).
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on corporate expenditures and reached holdings that did not prohibit the
government from restricting corporate expenditures.251
The campaign expenditure provision at issue in Buckley applied not
only to corporations but also to groups and individuals generally. 252 As
Justice Stevens pointed out in his Citizens United dissent, Buckley explicitly
distinguished between contributions and expenditures with respect to the
degree of restriction placed on political speech, but it was silent on whether
a restriction on expenditures would be constitutional if it were narrowly
tailored to restrict only corporations. 253 Thus, Buckley effectively left the
door open for legislatures to impose restrictions on corporate expenditures
on the basis of the threat that the corporate form poses to the integrity of our
political marketplace of ideas and, by extension, our democratic system as a
whole. 254 Legislatures did, in fact, walk through that door with BCRA
Section 203 and other restrictions on corporate campaign finance, and, as a
result, the “power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in
their treasuries to finance [campaign expenditures] . . . [became] firmly
embedded in our law.” 255
Additionally, in holding expenditure limits on individuals and groups
unconstitutional, the Buckley Court emphasized that a governmental interest
in equalizing the relative voices of individuals is “wholly foreign to the
First Amendment”—that First Amendment protections do not depend upon
an individual’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.”256 By
emphasizing the wealth of an individual as an impermissible basis for
regulating expenditures and remaining silent on the permissibility of
regulating expenditures on the basis of the corporate form, the Buckley
Court’s reasoning is not incompatible with corporate expenditure
restrictions. Where corporate expenditure restrictions are aimed not merely
at restricting corporations because of their wealth, but because of the “statecreated advantages” that promote the aggregation of wealth that could have
a corrosive effect on the marketplace of political ideas, corporate

251. The Buckley Court confronted a statute that placed a blanket restriction on campaign
expenditures from any individual or group. Id. at 13 (citing Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 9–10 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431–56 (2006)). The Bellotti Court faced a statute that restricted corporations from making
expenditures in relation to referenda if the referenda did not affect the corporation’s “material
interest.” First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978) (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
252. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
253. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 954 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. See id. (“[Buckley’s] silence on corporations only reinforced the understanding that
corporate expenditures could be treated differently from individual expenditures.”).
255. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876.
256. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
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restrictions are not in tension with Buckley. 257 For this same reason, the
Citizens United majority was incorrect in focusing on the effect that a
restriction on corporate expenditures would have on small corporations,
which make up the vast majority of corporations 258—because the
governmental interest in restricting corporate expenditures is based on the
corporate form. The majority in Citizens United mistakenly believed that
the governmental interest in restricting corporate expenditures had a basis in
wealth itself. 259
The Citizens United Court similarly erred in its analysis of Bellotti.
The statute at issue in Bellotti imposed a ban on corporate expenditures in
support of referenda unless the referenda substantially affected the
corporation’s interests, 260 a restriction that is easily distinguished from the
restriction at issue in Citizens United. Unlike BCRA Section 203, which
restricted corporate expenditures regardless of the corporate interest at hand
or the political candidate in question, the statute in Bellotti restricted
corporations based on the government’s assertion that corporations did not
have a sufficient interest in particular issues, and therefore they should be
banned from participating in political discussion of those issues.261 For this
reason, the statute at issue in Bellotti was a viewpoint-discrimination
statute, 262 as opposed to BCRA Section 203, which was aimed at the
corrosive effect of corporations generally, regardless of viewpoint. The
majority in Citizens United erred in rejecting this distinction; 263 thus, the

257. Cf. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (emphasizing
that an antidistortion interest is not an interest in equalizing the relative voices of political
speakers based on wealth), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
258. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (noting that most corporations “are small
corporations without large amounts of wealth”).
259. Id. at 904–05. This misguided focus led the Court to delve into a discussion of the logical
fallacy of a campaign finance regulatory regime that prohibits corporate campaign expenditures
because of their inordinate wealth but does not limit campaign expenditures made by wealthy
individuals. Id. at 908.
260. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978).
261. See id. at 784 (“The ‘materially affecting’ requirement . . . amounts to an impermissible
legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may
represent in public debate over controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a
sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communication.”).
262. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens
described the legislative background of the Massachusetts statute at issue in Bellotti, revealing
that, at the time the statute was enacted, the state legislature was attempting to adopt a
constitutional amendment establishing a graduated income tax. Id. Despite the support of many
legislators, the referendum to establish the tax had been overwhelmingly rejected by voters. Id.
In preparation for a renewed referendum on the tax, the legislature passed the restriction on
corporate expenditures on referenda and included a provision that stated that referenda related to
income tax did not affect the substantial interests of a corporation. Id.
263. See id. at 903 (majority opinion) (stating that the Bellotti decision “rested on the principle
that the Government lacks the power to ban corporations from speaking,” not “on the existence of
a viewpoint-discriminatory statute”).
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majority also erred in simply reaching the blunted conclusion that Bellotti
“rested on the principle that the Government lacks the power to ban
corporations from speaking.” 264
The Court should have instead
acknowledged that the statute in Bellotti effectively banned corporate
speech on specific issues that the government identified, effectively barring
the corporate viewpoint on those issues, while BCRA Section 203 barred
corporate expenditures because of the unique threat that corporations pose
to political speech.
C. Austin’s Antidistortion Rationale Was Not an Outlier in the Court’s
Campaign Expenditure Jurisprudence, but a Logical Extension of
the MCFL Exception
The majority failed to recognize that Austin was in step with the
Court’s prior decisions on campaign expenditures, including the cases in
which the Court tacitly accepted bans on corporate expenditures 265 and the
holdings in Buckley and Bellotti. 266 In United States v. CIO, 267 United
States v. UAW, 268 and Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States,269
the Court faced challenges to bans on corporate expenditures, yet in each
case the Court declined to address the constitutionality of those statutes.270
Thus, these cases left the door open for Congress to restrict corporate
expenditures. Contrary to the assertion of the Citizen’s United majority, 271
Buckley, in holding unconstitutional a blanket cap on individual and group
expenditures, 272 and Bellotti, in holding unconstitutional a state statute that
precluded corporate expenditures toward particular issues based on the
nature of the corporation’s interest, 273 did not foreclose restrictions on
corporate expenditures because of the corporate form.

264. Id.
265. See supra Part II.B.2.
266. See supra Part II.C.
267. 335 U.S. 106, 107, 124 (1948) (declining to decide whether a statute prohibiting the use
of corporate or labor organization funds for expenditures was unconstitutional).
268. 352 U.S. 567, 568, 589–93 (1957) (declining to decide the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 610, which prohibited corporations and labor organizations from making any contribution or
expenditure in relation to any election for federal office).
269. 407 U.S. 385, 387–88, 409 (1972) (declining to decide the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.
§ 610, and holding that § 610 does not apply to union campaign spending from funds financed by
voluntary employee donations).
270. See supra notes 267−269.
271. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902–03 (2010).
272. See supra Part II.C.1.
273. See supra Part II.C.2.
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Following Buckley and Bellotti, the Court in MCFL faced a challenge
to FECA Section 316, 274 which prohibited corporate expenditures, but
rather than hold the statute unconstitutional, the Court carved out an
exception for certain nonprofit corporations. 275 Just four months after
Buckley, and despite the MCFL decision, Congress recodified the
Section 316 ban. 276 The majority in Citizens United maintained that if this
ban had been challenged following Buckley, it could not have been
reconciled with Buckley’s reasoning and analysis.277 Nevertheless, MCFL
did not strike down Section 316 as an unconstitutional violation of
corporate freedom of speech. Rather, the MCFL Court held the statute
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL and created a three-prong exception
for nonprofit corporations. 278 In formulating the exception, the Court
clearly articulated the governmental interest that justified a ban on corporate
expenditures that do not meet the MCFL exception: “the corrosive influence
of concentrated corporate wealth” on the political marketplace, wealth that
generally does not reflect public support for a corporation’s political
ideas. 279 The MCFL Court’s decision to deliberately articulate a rationale
for restrictions on corporate expenditures (save for a narrow exception) is
therefore wholly incompatible with the Citizen United Court’s assertion that
a corporate expenditure ban would not have survived following Buckley.
Thus, Austin’s antidistortion rationale was not an outlier in the Court’s
campaign expenditure jurisprudence but a logical extension of the Court’s
MCFL corporate campaign expenditure exception.
Restrictions on
corporate expenditures were not barred by Buckley or Bellotti.
Accordingly, MCFL articulated and acquiesced to the reasoning behind
such restrictions, and Austin, in turn, fully developed MCFL’s reasoning to
produce the antidistortion rationale. Specifically, Austin’s antidistortion
rationale melded two characteristics of corporations that pose a “corrosive”
threat: (1) the massive quantities of wealth that corporations can acquire;

274. Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 316, 90 Stat. 490 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), invalidated
by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
275. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986) (outlining the three
factors of the MCFL exception).
276. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
277. Id. at 902. The majority reasoned that because “[t]he Buckley Court did not invoke the
First Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine” to find that the limits on individual and group
expenditures would have been constitutional as applied to corporations, and because some of the
plaintiffs in Buckley were in fact corporations, the Buckley Court’s reasoning precluded
restrictions based on corporate identity. Id.
278. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–64. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argued that the Court
should not have granted this exemption, and that the Court should not “fine-tune” congressional
judgment that a prophylactic measure against the corporate form is necessary given the Court’s
previous deference toward such measures. Id. at 268–69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
279. Id. at 257–59 (majority opinion).
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and (2) the state-conferred advantages of the corporate form that enable
corporations to acquire such large quantities of wealth. 280 The first
characteristic, massive quantities of wealth acquired using the corporate
form, presented the risk of corruption that has long been recognized as a
sufficient governmental interest in regulating campaign financing. 281 By
focusing on the wealth as a product of the corporate form and not the wealth
per se, the Austin Court was careful to identify the corporate form as the
target of restrictions on corporate expenditures. Thus, the antidistortion
rationale was not an equalization rationale but an anticorruption
rationale. 282
The second characteristic that Austin described was critical to its
holding because this characteristic set Austin’s holding apart from the
equalization rationale prohibited in Buckley. 283 Austin targeted the stateconferred advantages of the corporate form that facilitate the accumulation
of wealth in the economic marketplace; 284 it did not target the wealth of the
corporation as an isolated characteristic that justified a restriction on
expenditures. Thus, Austin’s antidistortion rationale was not, as the
Citizens United majority argued, 285 an equalization rationale aimed at
restricting the voices of some political speakers in order to increase the
relative voices of others. 286

280. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (pinpointing the
state-conferred benefits as the reason why the government can regulate corporations in ways that
it cannot regulate individuals), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
281. See supra notes 80–82; see also supra Part II.D. Indeed, corporations are more than
capable of acquiring staggering amounts of wealth that they can turn into campaign speech. In
2010, more than 100 countries had a gross domestic product of less than $20 billion. The World
CIA.GOV,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldFactbook,
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). During that same year, 119
American corporations had revenues that exceeded $20 billion, and forty American corporations
boasted more than $50 billion in revenues. 2010 Fortune 500, FORTUNE (May 3, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/full_list/.
282. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens stressed that the Court “expressly ruled [in Austin] that the compelling interest
supporting Michigan’s statute was not one of equaliz[ing] the relative influence of speakers on
elections, but rather the need to confront the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electoral
advocacy financed by general treasury dollars.” Id. at 958 (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 134–139.
284. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
285. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. The majority oversimplified the antidistortion
rationale by stating simply that it is “a means to prevent corporations from obtaining an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace by using resources amassed in the economic marketplace.”
Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 659) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the majority
glossed over the significance of the use of state-conferred corporate advantages, providing
superficial support for the majority’s equalization rationale accusation.
286. Id. at 904; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (articulating
the equalization rationale as follows: “the concept that government may restrict the speech of
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The majority in Citizens United misconstrued the antidistortion
rationale used in Austin to stand for the proposition that corporations are a
threat to the political process simply because of their ability to amass
wealth in the economic marketplace.287 If the majority were correct on this
point, then the antidistortion rationale would be in direct opposition to
Buckley’s prohibition on regulating political speakers on the basis of wealth
alone. 288 The antidistortion rationale in Austin, however, was concerned
with both (1) how corporations acquire the money to fund campaign
expenditures and (2) the potentially corrosive effect that money acquired
using the corporate form can have on the political process. First, the
corporate treasury consists of money that shareholders deposited in order to
produce a return, not necessarily to support the political speech of that
corporation; as a result, expenditures from the corporate treasury are
generally not traceable to an individual who had the intent of promulgating
the political views of the corporation.289 Second, because of the way
corporations acquire money to fund campaign expenditures, corporations
can have a distorting effect; this is so because the corporate general treasury
does not accurately reflect public support, regardless of whether the
corporation is wealthy. 290
D. By Failing to Uphold Restrictions on Corporate Expenditures,
Citizens United Released Phantom Speakers into the Political
Marketplace of Ideas
By overruling Austin and permitting corporate expenditures from the
general treasury, Citizens United effectively released phantom speakers into
the political marketplace of ideas. The term phantom speakers refers to the
specious nature of political speech emanating from a corporation’s general
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to
the First Amendment”).
287. Citizens United characterizes the antidistortion rationale as based solely on the wealth of a
corporation, then proceeds to attack this straw man argument by noting that most corporations are
actually not immensely wealthy. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 134–139.
289. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659−60. Compare this scenario to a wealthy individual who makes a
campaign expenditure out of his own funds. The speech promulgated via that expenditure can be
traced to an individual, whereas the corporate expenditure is traced to a fictional, state-created
“individual.” Where this Note focuses on the “phantom speaker” threat that manifests itself when
political speech cannot be traced to individual support, other scholars have delved further into the
notion that corporations are not “people” and thus should not be afforded First Amendment
protection. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 245 (2010)
(“Corporations are not people, nor are they entitled to all the constitutional rights of individual
citizens.”).
290. But see Issacharoff, supra note 237, at 122 (citing David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality,
and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) (stating that the distortion
theory of political corruption is a poor definition of corruption because it frames corruption as a
“derivative” of social inequalities generally)).
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treasury, as was described in MCFL and later in Austin. 291 Money in a
corporation’s general treasury, regardless of the size of the treasury, does
not necessarily reflect the political ideas of those whose money makes up
the general treasury. 292 Instead, this money reflects “the economically
motivated decisions” of those individuals, which may or may not
correspond to the corporation’s political beliefs.293 Segregated funds
established under PACs, which permit corporations to raise funds for the
express purpose of putting them toward expenditures, 294 were established
to ensure that corporate expenditures reflected actual political support for
the corporation’s political speech.295
The principle that expenditures should reflect actual public support for
the political ideas espoused by the speaker does not require that the speech
reflect the degree of actual political support behind the expenditure: the
amount of money used to promulgate speech need not be proportional to the
strength of the speaker’s belief in that speech.296 To require that kind of
alignment between campaign spending and the strength of the public’s
political ideas would be a clear attempt at equalization.297 Rather, the
speech must be tied to the actual support of the speakers whose money is
being used to promulgate that speech. 298 This reasoning is the precise
purpose behind the PAC exception and a common theme across the Court’s

291. See supra Part II.D.
292. See supra text accompanying note 167.
293. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986).
294. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
295. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258 (“The resources available to [a political action committee] fund,
as opposed to the corporate treasury, in fact reflect popular support for the political positions of
the committee.”). But see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“A [political action committee] is a
separate association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from § 441b’s expenditure ban,
§ 441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak.”).
296. Austin made no such assertion. The Austin Court stated only that restrictions on
expenditures “ensure[] that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas
espoused by corporations,” Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990), not that the expenditure be “equal to,” or in any way “proportional to,” political support
for a corporation’s political ideas.
297. Professor David A. Strauss has argued that corruption is merely a derivative of broader
inequalities in society. See Strauss, supra note 290, at 1371–82. This is so, according to Strauss,
because when competing campaign spending is allowed to take place in an open market in a
society with underlying inequality, corruption is inevitable. Id. Therefore, the only way to
eradicate corruption is to eradicate the inequality in the marketplace of campaign spending. Id. at
1382–89.
298. Cf. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660–61 (stating that the antidistortion rationale “ensures that
expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations” and
that political action committees fulfill that purpose “[b]ecause persons contributing to such funds
understand that their money will be used solely for political purposes, [and therefore] the speech
generated accurately reflects contributors’ support for the corporation’s political views”).
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decisions addressing the constitutionality of corporate and labor
organization expenditures. 299
Ensuring that corporate speech is prohibited unless that speech reflects
the political views of those whose money the corporation has used to
promulgate it maintains the integrity of the political marketplace. One
prominent theory of First Amendment freedom of speech protection is that
the marketplace of ideas is a critical component of our system of
government. 300
Another, and related, prominent theory of First
Amendment freedom of speech protection is the promotion of selfgovernment, which occurs in part through the exchange of political ideas in
the marketplace of ideas. 301 Both of these theories serve to undergird the
heightened protection political speech receives under the First
Amendment. 302
Traditionally, a free marketplace of ideas implies an almost complete
absence of restrictions on speech so that all ideas may battle each other in
the marketplace and listeners can, in deciding which ideas to accept, reach
the truth. 303 The marketplace of ideas theory emerged in early writings
defending the freedom of speech and expression.
John Milton’s
Areopagitica, for example, characterized the marketplace of ideas as a
battleground of truth and falsehoods and argued that the battleground
should remain open to all ideas, allowing listeners to hear all arguments and
debate their merits, so that truth could ultimately prevail. 304 John Stuart
Mill characterized the marketplace of ideas theory as a means to an end, the
299. This theme is evident in the Court’s finding that restrictions on corporate and labor union
campaign spending do not apply to funds to which individuals voluntarily make donations. See
generally, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) (holding
that restrictions on labor union campaign spending do not apply to political funds to which
members voluntarily contributed).
300. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those
who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties . . . . They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth . . . that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
be a fundamental principle of the American government.”).
301. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(describing the necessity and virtues of an open political marketplace of ideas).
302. See supra notes 68, 170, 299.
303. See Brian K. Pinaire, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Market: The Supreme
Court and Political Speech in the Electoral Process, 17 J.L. & POL. 489, 491 (2001) (“[W]hile a
‘free market’ of ideas has traditionally implied the (near) absence of restrictions on speech,
restrictions are now sanctioned—and even, in some cases, recommended—in the interest of a
genuinely open, ordered, and accessible marketplace of ideas.”).
304. See John Milton, Areopagitica, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 29, 37 (Garrett Epps ed., 2008)
(“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the
field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”).
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end being listeners’ search for and ultimate discovery of the truth.305 To
reach the truth, the marketplace must be free of suppression and
restraint. 306 The theory of the open marketplace of ideas is later embodied
in Justice Holmes’s famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 307 as well as in Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California. 308
Another prominent First Amendment freedom of speech theory—
freedom of speech as a means to self-government—is associated with
Alexander Meiklejohn’s writings and his town meeting analogy.309
According to Meiklejohn’s town meeting analogy of free expression, the
town meeting is open to all and “[t]he basic principle is that the freedom of
speech shall be unabridged.” 310 Nevertheless, the meeting must be
abridged in some respects so that the discussion is “responsible”; the town
meeting is self-government, not a “dialectical free-for-all.” 311 Under the
self-government theory, participants must have access to information that is
necessary to informed decision making and be able to communicate their
opinions to elected officials; if denied this opportunity, participants cannot
self-govern. 312 Meiklejohn’s self-government theory places a premium on
the protection of political speech.313 The heightened protection for speech
that is conducive to self-government is embodied in the Court’s First

305. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974)
(1859); see also Pinaire, supra note 303, at 496 (“Emphasizing openness, liberty and perpetual
questioning, Mill refined the imagery of the free exchange of ideas. His notion that free speech
was essential to the permanent interests of man as a progressive being, therefore, adjusted the
model from that of ‘grappling’ to ‘discovery,’ or a search engaged in by free and equal
individuals.”).
306. MILL, supra note 305, at 75−77; see also Pinaire, supra note 303, at 496 (“Truth [for
Mill] could only be realized, or rediscovered, in the absence of restraint and suppression.”).
307. See supra notes 170, 301 and accompanying text.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 69−71.
309. Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 72−73 (1989).
310. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22–
25 (1948). Meiklejohn’s self-government theory emphasizes political speech above all other
forms of expression. Id.
311. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,
258–59.
312. Solum, supra note 309, at 73.
313. Indeed, Meiklejohn’s theory posits that nonpolitical speech should not be afforded any
First Amendment freedom of speech protection. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 310, at 23. The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255—57, 261 (listing and describing
the forms of expression that he believes must be protected under the First Amendment because
they are essential to self-governing and asserting that all forms of expression that do not facilitate
self-government fall outside the scope of the First Amendment freedom of speech).
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Amendment jurisprudence that has long afforded heightened protection to
political speech.314
Yet the theories of promoting an open political marketplace of ideas
and of promoting self-government clash in the realm of corporate campaign
expenditures. Whereas the marketplace of ideas theory would support the
introduction of corporate political speakers as a means of permitting a
variety of political ideas to compete in the marketplace, 315 the selfgovernment theory would be undermined if corporations entered the
political speech arena. Corporate speech may, at first blush, appear to
comport with the self-government theory of First Amendment protection
because this theory endorses stringent political speech protection so that
listeners have access to all information necessary for informed decision
making. 316 Corporate political speakers, however, hinder self-government
because corporate speech is promulgated in the interest of a fictional
individual 317 that cannot vote 318 and may promulgate political speech using
money in its general treasury that was provided by shareholders who
directly oppose the corporation’s political ideas. 319
Though corporations can add speech to the political marketplace of
ideas that individuals weigh when making political decisions, corporate
political speech threatens the notion of self-government because an
“individual” that cannot vote infiltrates the marketplace among individuals
that can vote. 320 Moreover, a corporation infiltrates the marketplace of
ideas using funds obtained from voting individuals, money that voting
individuals likely did not provide to the corporation to support or aid in
promulgating the corporation’s political ideas. 321 Because general
treasuries do not consist of funds provided by individuals for the purpose of

314. See supra Part II.A.
315. The majority in Citizens United supported this result, stating that the First Amendment
errs on the side of more speech, not less. See supra text accompanying note 206.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 309−313.
317. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the First Amendment freedom of speech
protection does not extend to corporations because the Framers only intended for the protection to
extend to human beings. See supra text accompanying notes 225−227.
318. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that corporations should not be afforded the same First Amendment
protections as human beings because, inter alia, corporations “cannot vote or run for office”).
319. See supra text accompanying notes 167−168.
320. Granted, many other types of associations and organizations, including PACs and
nonprofits that met the MCFL exception, were permitted to engage in political speech while
corporations were not. But these entities were permitted to do so because the human beings
whose money funded these entities’ speech donated voluntarily and with the intent that the money
would go toward promulgating the entities’ political speech. See supra text accompanying note
99.
321. Shareholders invest in corporations for financial gain, not necessarily to support
corporations’ political positions. See supra text accompanying note 167.
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promulgating political speech, corporate speech may very well be in direct
opposition to the actual political leanings of the shareholders whose monies
the corporation uses are used to fund campaign expenditures.322 This result
threatens the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas in relation to the
First Amendment theory of self-government because the speech of voting
individuals 323 is effectively pitted against the speech of nonvoting, fictional
individuals that use these same voting individuals’ money to engage in this
opposing speech. The ability of corporations to amass great wealth through
the corporate form can exacerbate this threat, possibly drowning out the
voices of the very individuals whose money funds corporate speech. In
turn, voting individuals are hindered in their ability to engage in informed
decision making. 324 By holding that the legislature cannot restrict
corporate expenditures, the Citizens United Court effectively unleashed
phantom speakers into the political marketplace of ideas, posing a threat to
the ability of individuals to self-govern.
V. CONCLUSION
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that a ban on the
use of corporate general treasuries to fund speech advocating the election or
defeat of a political candidate violated the First Amendment. 325 In so
holding, the Court understated the threat of corruption that corporations
pose to the political process. 326 The majority incorrectly characterized
Austin’s antidistortion rationale as an outlier in the Court’s corporate
expenditure jurisprudence 327 when it failed to recognize that both Buckley
and Bellotti did not entirely preclude regulation of corporate expenditures
based on the unique identity of corporations. 328 Austin’s antidistortion
rationale was not an anomaly but a natural extension of the MCFL
exception, which the Court created in light of the governmental interest in
ensuring that expenditures reflect actual public support.329

322. This is the precise problem the Court articulated in both MCFL and Austin. See supra
Part II.D.
323. The term “voting individual” encompasses both individuals acting as individuals and in
association for political purposes. See supra note 320.
324. If individuals are denied access to information because the voices of those whose money
funds corporate speech are drowned out, they are unable to effectively self-govern. See supra text
accompanying note 312.
325. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
326. See supra Part IV.A.
327. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (stating that Austin “bypass[ed]” Buckley and
Bellotti” by adopting an antidistortion rationale and noting that “[n]o case before Austin had held
that Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political speech based on the speaker’s
corporate identity”); see also supra Part IV.B.
328. See supra Part IV.B.
329. See supra Part IV.C.
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State-conferred benefits place corporations in the unique position of
being able to create the appearance of strong political backing for political
positions that may only have the backing of a handful of actual
individuals. 330 It is this corporate form, created by state-conferred benefits,
and the disconnect between the general treasury and the political views of
those who fund the treasury, that the MCFL and Austin Courts pointed to as
the key rationale for restricting corporate expenditures. 331 The majority in
Citizens United did not recognize that treating corporations differently for
expenditure purposes on the basis of the corporate form actually aligns with
Buckley, Bellotti, and the Court’s prior corporate expenditure
jurisprudence. 332 As a result, the Citizens United majority invited phantom
speakers to participate in, and distort, American politics through the
marketplace of political speech.333

330.
331.
332.
333.

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.A−B.
See supra Part IV.D.

